If Students Can’t Sue the School Board, Who Can? Montesa v. Schwartz and the Case for a New Approach to Establishment Clause Standing by Salamon, Bracha
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2019
If Students Can’t Sue the School Board, Who Can?
Montesa v. Schwartz and the Case for a New
Approach to Establishment Clause Standing
Bracha Salamon
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Salamon, Bracha, "If Students Can’t Sue the School Board, Who Can? Montesa v. Schwartz and the Case for a New Approach to
Establishment Clause Standing" (2019). Law School Student Scholarship. 986.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/986
2 
 
If Students Can’t Sue the School Board, Who Can? 
Montesa v. Schwartz and the Case for a New Approach to Establishment Clause Standing 
 
Part I: Introduction 
 School boards have multiple responsibilities.  They oversee the distribution of funds, 
determine and adjust school policies, and are supposed to care for the students in a neutral 
manner, without promoting religion.  Therefore, it is more than a little surprising that a school 
board in upstate New York ordered books that “reflected traditional values and stories rooted in 
the Jewish tradition.”1  These books included titles such as “Let’s Go to Shul!”, and “Why 
Weren’t You Zisha and Other Stories.”2  The East Ramapo School Board allegedly purchased 
these obviously religiously themed books and loaned them to local yeshiva students.3 
 The East Ramapo School Board also allegedly engaged in real estate practices that 
favored the local Orthodox community.  For example, the school board closed Colton 
Elementary School and leased the building to the Hebrew Academy for Special Children 
(“HASC”) and Congregation Bais Malka (a synagogue).4  For three of the five years of the lease, 
the school board did not increase the rent and allowed HASC to pay the rent late.5    
 Some local residents also alleged that the school board appropriated Individuals with 
Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) funds to favor yeshiva students.6  The school board supposedly had an 
                                                          
1 Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176, 193 (2d Cir. 2016). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 192. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 191-92. 
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“unwritten agreement” with Hasidic parents that amounted to “manipulating the IDEA 
settlement process” and sending funds away from the district’s public schools, instead funneling 
them towards Hasidic religious institutions.”7 
 As of 2015, East Ramapo had about 32,000 children enrolled in the district’s schools.8  
Of those 32,000 students, 24,000 attended private schools, mostly Jewish Orthodox yeshivas.9  
Of the nearly 8,000 students in public school, more than 80% were poor and 27% were English-
language learners.10  The school board has faced allegations of favoring the private schools.11  
While the school board decreased public school funding, it increased spending on private 
schools, especially on gender-segregated busing to yeshivas.12 
The district caught the attention of the New York State Education Department (NYSED).  
NYSED monitored the district and recommended changes.13  NYSED “determined that the 
District had failed to implement the recommended changes. As a result, NYSED withheld 
reimbursement, thereby costing the District millions of dollars.”14 
Current East Ramapo public school students sued the school board, alleging that the 
school board’s actions violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.15  
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law 
                                                          
7 Id. 
8 Merryl H. Tisch & David C. Sciarra, When a School Board Victimizes Kids, New York Times, (June 3, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/when-a-school-board-victimizes-kids.html. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See Josh Nathan-Kazis, East Ramapo Monitors See Progress in Orthodox-Dominated School District, Forward, 
(January 24, 2017), http://forward.com/news/361012/east-ramapo-monitors-see-progress-in-orthodox-dominated-
school-district-ask/. 
12 Tisch & Sciarra, supra. 
13 836 F.3d at 192.   
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 193. 
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respecting an establishment of religion…”16  Specifically, the student-plaintiffs alleged that the 
school board had promoted the Hasidic Jewish faith by (1) funding Hasidic schools with public 
monies through manipulating the IDEA settlement process to the yeshivas’ advantage, (2) 
favoring the Hasidic institutions during the process of selling and leasing school buildings, and 
(3) purchasing books with religious themes with public money and lending the books to 
yeshivas.  The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated the Establishment Clause.17  The 
student-plaintiffs sought an injunction, monetary damages, and attorneys’ fees.18   
The district court rejected the defendants’ claim that the student-plaintiffs lacked 
standing.19  On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision 
on standing, determining that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirements to show standing.20  
This decision appears to be the first time that the Second Circuit directly addressed the issue of 
public school student standing in Establishment Clause claims that allege educational harm.  It 
also appears that this specific issue has not been addressed in other circuits, as opposed to the 
more commonly addressed issues of parental standing and taxpayer standing in Establishment 
Clause cases.  Therefore, Montesa is especially significant, not just in the Second Circuit, but 
nationally, because it sets a precedent in the Second Circuit that other circuits are likely to 
consider if they are confronted with similar challenges.   
This case is especially important because without standing, students are barred from 
challenging the school boards’ actions in court, even if the constitutional violation appears quite 
obvious.  And if school boards know that the students can never even get their Establishment 
                                                          
16 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 194. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 201. 
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Claims heard in court, there in nothing to deter rampant violations of students’ constitutional 
rights. 
This comment will discuss the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Montesa and argue that 
its reasoning was erroneous. I will discuss the history of standing jurisprudence, specifically in 
relation to Establishment Clause claims.   Next, I will discuss the consequences of Establishment 
Clause standing jurisprudence, and argue that modern standing doctrine is too narrow, and must 
be broadened.  Lastly, I will analyze standing jurisprudence in relation to Montesa and conclude 
that the Second Circuit’s standing jurisprudence in Establishment Clause cases should change 
and be reversed. 
 
Part II. Montesa’s Resoning: 
The Montesa majority opinion began by reviewing the fundamentals of standing 
jurisprudence.21  According to the Constitution, federal courts can only consider “Cases” or 
“Controversies.”22  In order to be considered a “Case,” a plaintiffs must establish that they have 
standing to sue.23  Lujan set forth three elements to determine whether a litigant has standing.24  
The plaintiff must show that there exists: “(1) An injury in fact; (2) A sufficient causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) A likelihood that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”25  The injury in fact must be “concrete and 
particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”26 
                                                          
21 Id. at 195. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
25 836 F.3d at 195 (internal quotation omitted). 
26 504 U.S. at 560-61. 
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 The majority then turned to discussing prudential standing in particular.27  Prudential 
standing “encompasses the rule against the adjudication of generalized grievances, the rule 
prohibiting plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third parties, and the rule barring claims that fall 
outside ‘the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question.’”28  Next, the majority discussed prudential standing in relation to the 
Establishment Clause.29 
 The Constitution’s First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion.”30  Establishment Clause claims have their own unique rules for 
standing because of the “particularly elusive” nature of Establishment Clause claims, which 
usually do not focus on concrete financial or physical harm.31  Standing jurisprudence has 
developed three ways for a plaintiff to assert standing in an Establishment Clause claim: “(1) 
taxpayer, (2) direct harm, and (3) denial of benefits.”32 
 The court then addressed the student-plaintiff’s direct-exposure theory.33  The court said 
that direct exposure standing exists in the following circumstances: when (1) a plaintiff is 
subjected to government control or constrained by a governmental “policy, regulation, or statute 
grounded in a ‘religious’ tenet or principle”; or (2) a plaintiff is personally confronted with a 
“government-sponsored religious expression that directly touches the plaintiff's religious or non-
                                                          
27 836 F.2d at 195. 
28 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
29 Id. at 195-96. 
30 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
31 836 F. 3d at 196 (internal quotation omitted). 
32 Id. at 195. 
33 Id. at 196. 
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religious sensibilities.” In both of those instances, the plaintiffs’ interaction with or exposure to 
the religious part of the governmental action gives rise to the injury.”34   
 The court concluded that the student-plaintiffs’ claims did not fit any of these direct 
exposure circumstances.35  The student-plaintiff’s had claimed that they were “directly affected” 
by the school board’s alleged unconstitutional acts because those acts resulted in direct 
educational harm.36  As proof of this educational harm, the student-plaintiffs provided the 
following examples of ways the school board harmed the education of public school students as 
a result of their “unconstitutional diversion” of funds to religious institutions.   
The plaintiffs alleged that the school board had significantly decreased spending on 
school programs considered “fundamental to the operation of the public schools,” including the 
number of advanced classes offered, and had cut the number of teachers and guidance counselors 
working with students in the schools. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the school board 
“eliminated all assistant principals” and got rid of extracurricular activities, including art and 
music.  Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the school board eliminated the Students with 
Interrupted Formal Education (SIFE) program, which helped immigrant students “achieve their 
full potential” and prevent them from falling behind the rest of the student body.  Overall, the 
student-plaintiffs alleged directly harmed the plaintiff’s education by transferring resources, 
causing the student-plaintiffs to ‘[perform] below their peers in state-mandated academic 
examinations.’”37   
                                                          
34 Id. at 197. 
35 Id. at 198. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
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The court rejected the argument that educational harm as a result of unconstitutional 
actions qualified as direct harm.  The court reasoned that the students were not directly exposed 
to an overtly religious law or a law with an religious message that impeded their education, nor 
were the public school students exposed to religious messages or themes sponsored by the 
government.38  The court concluded that the educational harm was only incidental to the school 
board’s actions.39  Additionally, the court noted that no appeals court has ever recognized the 
student-plaintiff’s theory of direct exposure.40  Without citing evidence, the court also stated that 
the educational harm the student-plaintiffs alleged was the result of a school system that was 
completely underfunded, and that there was an insufficient causal connection between the 
underfunding of the public schools and the alleged constitutional violations.41  The court also 
said that despite being actual students the student-plaintiffs’ injury was “common to all 
individuals” affected by the school district’s budget.42  
 
Part III. Standing Jurisprudence 
A. Establishment Clause Standing in General: An Overview 
 The modern standard for determining questions of standing was outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Lujan.43  The issue in Lujan was whether an environmental group had standing to 
challenge the enforcement of environmental regulations.44  The group’s members claimed that 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 199. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 200. 
43 504 U.S. at 560-61. 
44 Id. at 558-59. 
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the possibility of no longer being able to travel abroad and observe endangered animals satisfied 
the injury requirement of sanding doctrine.45  The majority rejected the environmental group’s 
claim that its members would suffer “actual or imminent injury” as a result of the way the 
regulations were enforced, which possibly could lead to a faster extinction of certain animal 
species.46  Additionally, where there is actual harm, standing clearly exists, but the exact extent 
of the harm remains to be determined at trial.47  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
environmental group did not have standing because the claims of injury were too attenuated.48 
 The Supreme Court has also addressed the unique rules of standing in Establishment 
Clause challenges.49  According to the current framework, plaintiffs may demonstrate standing 
based on (1) the establishment of religion causing direct harm, for example, a mandatory prayer 
program in a public school classroom; or (2) if the plaintiffs allege that they have “incurred a 
cost or been denied a benefit on account of their religion,” such as claimed discrimination in tax 
benefits; or (3) taxpayer standing.50 
But the rules for demonstrating standing in Establishment Clause cases were not always 
this demanding.  In 1982, the Supreme Court held, for the first time since 1952, that the plaintiff 
did not have standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim.51  In Valley Forge Christian 
College, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the 
conveyance of land by the government to a religious institution.52  The Supreme Court said that 
                                                          
45 Id. at 563-64. 
46 Id. at 564. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 578. 
49 836 F.3d at 195 
50 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2011). 
51 William P. Marshall & Maripat Flood, Article: Establishment Clause Standing: The Not Very Revolutionary 
Decision At Valley Forge, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 63,  66 (1982). 
52 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 468 (1982). 
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the plaintiffs had not identified any personal injury inflicted “as a consequence of the alleged 
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by 
observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”53  The Court added that “[the plaintiffs’] 
claim that the Government has violated the Establishment Clause does not provide a special 
license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries 
in federal court,” and that federal courts are not “ombudsmen of the general welfare.”54   
In its holding, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals, which had determined 
that the plaintiffs did have standing.55  According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals 
had erred “out of the conviction that enforcement of the Establishment Clause demands special 
exceptions” from the standing requirement of a concrete injury.56  The Supreme Court rejected 
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that there should be unique rules for Establishment Clause 
standing, and said that the mere assumption that if the present plaintiffs did not have standing, 
“no one would have standing,” is not a reason to confer standing where there is none.57  The 
Court was unwilling to accept the premise that if there were people who had been directly 
injured, they would have joined the suit, and that in the absence of people who had been directly 
injured, others must sue to remedy the violation.58 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Id. at 485. 
54 Id. at 487. 
55 Id. at 488. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 489. 
58 Id. 
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B. Taxpayer Standing 
Valley Forge effectively limited Flast v. Cohen, an earlier decision related to standing in 
Establishment Clause cases, which addressed the issue of taxpayer standing.59  In Flast, the 
Supreme Court held that taxpayers only had standing to challenge federal expenditures as 
violations of the Establishment Clause in certain situations.60  The Court said that the “nexus” of 
taxpayer standing has two components.61  First, the taxpayer must demonstrate a “logical link” 
between his or her taxpayer status and the law being challenged.62  The legislative action being 
challenged must fall under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution,” not 
“incidental expenditure” of taxes in an “essentially regulatory statute.”63  Second, the taxpayer 
must demonstrate a link between his or her taxpayer status and the “precise nature of the 
constitutional infringement alleged.”64  This requirement means that taxpayers must establish 
that the challenged statute “exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise 
of the congressional taxing and spending power,” not just that the statute “is generally beyond 
the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.”65  According to the Court, this framework 
guarantees that the taxpayer will have a real stake in the litigation and be a constitutionally 
proper party to the litigation.66 
The Flast decision is difficult to understand, since the taxpayers practically alleged a 
generalized grievance.67  It appears that to get around that issue in this case, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
59 Nancy C. Staudt, Article: Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 612, 628 (2004). 
60 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968). 
61 Id at 102. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Carl H. Esbeck, Essay: What The Hein Decision Can Tell Us About The Roberts Court And The 
Establishment Clause, 78 Miss. L.J. 199, 209 (2008). 
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“adopted a legal fiction,” that “every taxpayer has an individualized interest, vested in the 
Establishment Clause understood as a power-denying restraint on congressional appropriations 
being directed in aid of religion.68  Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged its embrace of 
this “legal fiction.”  In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Justice Alito mentioned this legal 
fiction when discussing whether the taxpayer-plaintiffs in the case had standing: “In light of the 
size of the federal budget, it is a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional federal 
expenditure causes an individual federal taxpayer any measurable economic harm. And if every 
federal taxpayer could sue to challenge any Government expenditure, the federal courts would 
cease to function as courts of law and would be cast in the role of general complaint bureaus.”69  
The Court’s adoption of this legal fiction allowed it “to reach the merits in the absence of a 
complainant suffering specific ‘injury in fact’ or actual harm.”70   
 
C. Parental Standing 
Another much-litigated question is the issue of parental standing in Establishment Clause 
cases.  The Second Circuit addressed this issue in a 1992 case, Sullivan v. Syracuse Housing 
Authority.  The plaintiff in that case was a father asserting the third-party interests of his son.71 
Specifically, the father alleged that the Syracuse Housing Authority had violated the 
Establishment Clause by allowing a Christian organization to operate out of a community center 
in a housing development.72  The father alleged that the Christian organization had exposed his 
son to religious ideas that made the father “concerned because his son is preoccupied by thoughts 
                                                          
68 Id. 
69 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 592 (2007); Esbeck, supra, at 210. 
70 Esbeck, supra, at 211. 
71 Sullivan v. Syracuse Housing Authority, 962 F.2d 1101, 1107 (2d Cir. 1992). 
72 Id. at 1105. 
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of heaven and hell and sin.”73  The Second Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling that the 
father had no standing to sue on behalf of his son because the father had not proven any “actual 
injury” and “had done nothing more than assert his ‘mere tenancy in a building in which 
religious activities occurred, and had alleged no injury beyond the ’psychological consequence 
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.’”74   
Rejecting the district court’s reasoning, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had 
established “with sufficient clarity a claim that he has been deprived of his right to use and enjoy 
the community center, as well as a claim that a religion has been established in a place 
functionally analogous to Sullivan's own home.”75  The court considered the record that stated 
that the plaintiff found the establishment of religion in a place “functionally analogous to 
[plaintiff’s] own home,” and that in the court’s view, the plaintiff was not a “simple bystander.”76   
Additionally, the court said that a plaintiff “may have a spiritual stake in First 
Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment 
Clause,” and so the alleged harm does not have to be economic.77  The court also considered the 
plaintiff’s claim that he was injured by his son’s unwanted exposure to religion, and held that in 
that sense he was not merely claiming injury on behalf of a third party (his son), but rather had 
standing to challenge an injury to himself.78  Additionally, the court also noted that standing is a 
threshold issue, and when considering it, courts should accept the plaintiff’s factual claims, and 
not judge the case on its merits.79 
                                                          
73 Id.  
74 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
75 Id. at 1108. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1107. 
78 Id. at 1109. 
79 Id. at 1106-1108. 
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D. Psychological Injury as Direct Harm 
 Aside from a parent alleging direct injury as a result of a child’s exposure to religion, 
there are other instances where courts seem to move beyond the strict interpretation of direct 
harm.  There are multiple cases where courts have held that alleged psychological harm qualifies 
as direct harm for standing purposes.80  In ACLU v. Ohio Found., Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that 
“the mere presence of a poster displaying the Ten Commandments demonstrated sufficient 
‘psychological injury in fact’ to create standing.”81  The Sixth Circuit cited a 1994 case in which 
it said that psychological injury may suffice when the injury from the contact is direct and more 
than a vicarious claim.82  When Catholics and a Catholic advocacy group sued the city of San 
Francisco, alleging that a city resolution denouncing the Catholic Church violated the 
Establishment Clause, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did have standing.83  The court 
said that psychological harm “constitute[s] concrete harm where the ‘psychological 
consequence’ is produced by government condemnation of one’s own religion or endorsement of 
another’s in one’s own community.”84 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 See ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Deweese, 633 F.3d 484, (6th Cir. 2011); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. 
Sch., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994); Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 
624 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
81 633 F.3d at 489 n.3 (internal quotations omitted). 
82 33 F.3d at 682. 
83 624 F.3d at 1046-48. 
84 Id. at 1052. 
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Part IV. Analysis of Montesa 
A. The Second Circuit Should Have Determined That Educational Harm is Direct Harm 
 Based on current standing jurisprudence, the majority in Montesa erred in its application 
of precedent and its finding that the students in Montesa did not have standing to sue the school 
board.  The court mistakenly determined that the educational harm that the students alleged was 
not direct enough to constitute injury sufficient for standing.  Based on the psychological cases 
like ACLU of Ohio, Inc. and Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights, the alleged harm to 
the Ramapo students should have been held as being sufficiently direct.  If psychological harm as 
a result of the state actor endorsing a religion is considered sufficient harm for standing, 
educational harm as a result of funding schemes that purposely aid only certain religious schools 
at the expense of public schools certainly is direct harm.  It is not difficult to conclude that such 
funding schemes constitute a state actor endorsing a specific religion, so the school board’s 
funding of religious institutions and studies certainly qualifies as “endorsement of another’s 
[religion] in one’s own community.”85   
 The majority also ignored the issue of parental standing.  It cited Sullivan only to outline 
the basics of standing, but did not discuss the facts of Sullivan or distinguish it from Montesa.86   
It is difficult to see how a child’s exposure to religion gives someone else (the parent) standing to 
sue, but students themselves do not have standing when their education is allegedly harmed.  
This conundrum is especially so when one considers the Second Circuit’s characterization of the 
facts in Sullivan, and its acceptance that “[b]y acting pursuant to and enforcing the religious 
                                                          
85 Id. 
86 See 836 F.3d at 196-97. 
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policy complained of herein, the defendant is denying the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of public 
housing facilities.”87  That is analogous to Montesa, because the school board’s alleged 
endorsement of religious activities denied the student-plaintiffs adequate funding in their public 
schools. 
 And while it is true that daily exposure in a classroom to a display of the Ten 
Commandments may be a more overt symbol of government endorsement of religion, the alleged 
funneling of public funds away from public schools and towards religious activities is more 
harmful to children’s futures.  As the court said in Sullivan, at the pleading stage, the factual 
allegations should be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.88  Therefore, the court 
should have accepted, for standing analysis purposes only, that the school board acted 
unconstitutionally.  In that case, the harm would have to have been to the public school students, 
and the educational harm of inadequately funded schools to them was quite concrete, much more 
so than psychological injury.   
The majority simply took too narrow a view of injury in this case because it chose to 
apply a strict view of injury in fact and direct harm.  In dissent, Judge Reiss took issue with this 
narrow view of standing and said he would view the plaintiff’s claims as “broader than the 
majority’s formulation,” and opined that the “Establishment Clause does not require ‘direct 
exposure’ to the unconstitutional establishment of religion.”89  Rather, the dissent would have 
concluded that the students were “directly affected” by the defendant’s alleged violations of the 
Establishment Clause.”90  The plaintiffs could prove this causal link by producing “budgetary 
                                                          
87 962 F.2d at 1105 (emphasis in original). 
88 962 F.2d at 1106-08. 
89 836 F.2d at 201 (Reiss, J. Dissenting). 
90 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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records and academic test scores a direct causal link between defendants’ alleged diversion of 
District funds and the academic harm they suffer.”91  Accepting this premise does not require 
much imagination.  Students are directly affected when less money is spent on their education as 
a result of it purposely being spent on religious schools and activities directly related to religious 
education. 
In the dissent’s view, the majority also failed to properly analyze the case in light of its 
stage in the litigation.  At the pleadings stage, the standings requirements should be “neither 
stringent nor inflexible.”92  The main inquiry should have been if the claim “fall[s] within the 
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question.”93 
It is a generally accepted principle that with better education comes improved 
opportunities.94  The school board’s alleged underfunding of East Ramapo’s public schools could 
potentially impact many students’ futures beyond their actual schooling in East Ramapo.  One 
can easily draw a direct line from the alleged unconstitutional spending on religious schools to 
educational harm to the public school students.  The plaintiffs’ attorney described the alleged 
harm to a local news website as “depriving public school children of a sound-basis education and 
an opportunity for achievement and a quality education.”95  And that harm sounds quite concrete 
and direct. 
                                                          
91 Id. at 204. 
92 Id. at 202. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. at 204. 
95 Janie Rosman, Hoping for a Jury Trial: Lawsuit against East Ramapo School District continues, Rockland Cty. 
Times (July 16, 2015), http://www.rocklandtimes.com/2015/07/16/hoping-for-a-jury-trial-lawsuit-against-east-
ramapo-school-district-continues/.   
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The dissent also noted that the majority failed to address a major detail: The student-
plaintiffs alleged an injury, educational harm, which cannot be claimed by the general public and 
taxpayers.96  It is not just anyone who can claim this harm; it is specific to these public school 
students in East Ramapo.  The students are the only people who can allege the harm, and 
therefore are in the best position to sue. 
 
B. Modern Standing Doctrine is Flawed and too Narrow 
But it is perhaps not surprising that the Montesa decision seems inconsistent with 
precedent.  There is tension built into Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence, because of 
the difficulty in defining harm in some Establishment Clause cases as concrete.  It is confusing 
that psychological injury from mere exposure to religion can be concrete enough for standing, 
but the educational harm in Montesa does not qualify as sufficiently concrete.   
In the words of one expert, “the law of standing is at best confusing and at worst a serious 
impediment to fair and just outcomes.”97  Put in other words, standing doctrine has always been 
inconsistent and not just in Establishment Clause cases98  For example, some scholars claim that 
the Court has been rigorously demanding in its standing standard in environmental cases, even 
though individual injury is not at the heart of many environmental claims.”99  Standing doctrine 
has even been called a “Rorschach test for federal courts.”100   
                                                          
96 836 F.3d at 204 (Reiss, J. Dissenting). 
97 Staudt, supra, at 613. 
98 David M. Driesen, Article: Standing For Nothing: The Paradox Of Demanding Concrete Context For Formalist 
Adjudication, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 808, 876 (2004). 
99 Id.  
100 Daniel E. Ho and Erica L. Ross, Article: Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?   An Empirical Study 
of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594 (2010). 
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Because standing jurisprudence in these cases is so confusing and “incoherent,” judges 
end up relying on their own viewpoints to determine who has standing in court.101  The 
inconsistency in the results of standing cases “leads to suspicion that decisions on standing in 
close cases may be guided more by the courts' instincts toward the merits than by an independent 
determination of the parties’ eligibility to invoke jurisdiction.”102  It is quite possible that case are 
determined by judges’ political opinions than by legal doctrine.103  This conclusion is not 
difficult to reach when “liberals generally favored broad standing while conservatives were for 
narrower approaches: conservatives favored standing for banks while liberals usually did not, 
and the votes were reversed when it came to standing for prisoners, employees, and 
environmentalists.”104 
There is also a strong case to be made for the premise that judges sometimes just use 
standing as an excuse to not rule on the merits of a case.105  One scholar says that liberal Justices 
historically have applied a more “relaxed approach” to increase access for plaintiffs attempting 
to champion progressive laws and causes, whereas conservatives follow stricter standing rules 
“to keep out ACLU types” but then relax the standing standard for businesses and other plaintiffs 
that conservatives would like to be successful.106  This reality especially disadvantages plaintiff 
groups that may not be particularly popular, especially if they are suing a politically powerful 
individual or entity.  Even if the plaintiff could satisfy many judges’ application of standing 
                                                          
101 Staudt, supra, at 615. 
102  Marc C. Rahdert, Article: Forks Taken And Roads Not Taken: Standing To Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1009, 1015-16 (2011). 
103 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Essay: All Rise! Standing In Judge Betty Fletcher's Court, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 19, 21 (2010). 
104 Rowe, supra, at 22. 
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doctrine, the plaintiff may be out of luck just because content of the claim makes it difficult for 
the case to even be heard on the merits. 
The problems with standing jurisprudence are “particularly vivid” in relation to 
Establishment Clause cases.107  These difficulties are evident in the wildly inconsistent results in 
Establishment Clause standing cases.108  Sometimes the court rejects Establishment Clause 
challenges because of a lack of standing.  Sometimes, it “loosens the knots” of standing doctrine 
to allow challenges to actions that otherwise are difficult to resolve, and at times the court treats 
these cases as special, “calling for unique (and more generous) standing rules.”  And at other 
times, the court treats Establishment Clause standing questions with the same inconsistent 
approach it applies to other cases.109   
Possibly the biggest question one is left with after reviewing Establishment Clause 
standing jurisprudence is how can there be a violation of the Establishment Clause with no 
injury?110  For example legislative appropriations may contradict the rule of no-establishment-
like the federal education funding of religious schools at issue in Flast- “yet there is no 
individual or organization with ‘injury in fact,’ and thus no one with traditional standing to 
sue.”111  If the Establishment Clause is considered such a foundational part of American 
government, the Constitution, and our national conscience, it seems incredulous that alleged 
blatant Establishment Clause violations can occur but no one can claim injury sufficient for 
standing.   
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If there is a violation, standing doctrine should be broad enough that someone can sue for 
a remedy. Historically, the “injury in fact” requirement is “of relatively recent vintage” and was 
not part of standing doctrine until 1970.112   The origins of legal standing doctrine are considered 
a basic question not easily answered by scholars.113  This mystery is especially magnified by 
some legal historians’ argument that current standing rules have “little or no foundation” in the 
framing period or the time soon after the Constitution was ratified.114  The injury in fact 
requirement was not even part of English practices.115  And the lack of a historical injury in fact 
requirement is in addition to standing doctrine in general being a “twentieth century judicial 
creation,” as the relative recentness of the standing cases demonstrate.116  Over the last sixty or 
so years, standing doctrine has been influenced by “the pragmatic realities of contemporary 
litigation than by any quest for determination of the Framers' original intention.”117  One theory 
of how standing doctrine developed is that around the turn of the century, judges needed a way to 
trim a growing caseload.118  One way of managing the caseload was to introduce stricter standing 
rules that had not been previously applied.119The malleability of standing doctrines demonstrates 
that the doctrine lacks a firm constitutional foundation.120   
Still, one should not argue that we do away with standing jurisprudence, particularly the 
injury in fact requirement, altogether.  After all, at this point the doctrine of stare decisis backs 
up current standing doctrine.121   
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But the standing doctrine should be broad enough to provide relief to those who have 
been injured, and “lead to more liberal treatment of injury, which might include less use of 
heightened pleading requirements to screen out injured plaintiffs and more generous application 
of the doctrine that a court should view a plaintiff's challenged allegations of injury in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff on summary judgment. Lowering these barriers to presentation of 
facts might increase the flow of concrete experience into the courtroom and therefore might do 
more to improve concreteness than the standing doctrine ever did.”122  Such a change would help 
prevent the Establishment Clause from becoming meaningless in certain contexts. 
Some argue that a strict application of the current standing jurisprudence “helps assure 
vigorous argument.”123  But this premise is flawed.  As Justice Scalia has argued, an ideological 
plaintiff with absolutely no injury may strongly believe in something and therefore argue the 
case vigorously, perhaps even more so than someone injured.124  Additionally, the fact that 
plaintiffs argue vigorously that they do have standing and go through that litigation speaks to 
their commitment to the litigation.   
The possibility of the Establishment Clause becoming meaningless in certain contexts 
(because it would be difficult to show sufficient harm) is especially real in the school context.  In 
that context, like in Montesa, students may have real grievances.  They may allege obvious and 
purposeful violations.  Yet somehow they have not been injured enough for some courts like the 
Second Circuit. 
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If students themselves do not have standing to challenge the school board, who does?  
According to the majority, the answer seems to be no one.  And that answer means students are 
effectively powerless in the courts.  American jurisprudence must change, and the circuit courts 
should adapt the broader view of standing applied in psychological harm cases to cases like 
Montesa.  Such a shift would have real effects in the classroom, because students would be 
empowered to challenge school board decisions that harm the students.  That new reality may 
deter school boards’ violations.  
Some may say that from a policy perspective, it is not necessary for students to be able to 
sue school boards to meaningfully affect change.  It is okay that no one may haves standing to 
challenge a school board, because it is possible that “some constitutional provisions be subject 
only to political, not legal enforcement[.]”125  After all, their parents and communities can vote, 
right?  But it is not enough that some students have parents who can vote for school board 
members they feel will protect the students’ rights; not all parents vote, and children’s 
constitutional rights should not depend on their parents’ votes.  This insulates school boards from 
consequences of any violations, and may encourage them to continue unconstitutional practices, 
since there is no fear of being checked by the courts. 
Of course, it is difficult to ignore another reason why the courts may be reluctant to 
involve themselves in cases like Montesa: These cases are politically charged and touch on 
issues such as religion, race, and class.  There is technically a political and democratic solution, 
because there are school board elections, so why involve the courts?  But that attitude ignores the 
political and social realities in places like East Ramapo.  As the demographic makeup of 
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communities like East Ramapo continue to undergo dramatic and fast change, the rights of the 
people in the minority in these neighborhoods are at risk of being neglected by the electoral 
process, and must instead be protected by the courts. 
The plaintiffs in Montesa have a “substantial” case, and one expert says that he would not 
be surprised if they appeal the Second Circuit’s decision.   If the Supreme Court were to grant 
certiorari, it would be a momentous chance to broaden standing jurisprudence and overturn the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Montesa.  However, the current conservative majority on the Court 
might make that outcome unlikely, as currently, conservatives are more likely to not grant 
standing.126   
 
Part V. Conclusion 
 The Second Circuit erred in deciding that the student-plaintiffs in Montesa did not have 
standing to sue the school board.  The majority took too narrow a view of standing in this case, 
and ignored its own circuit’s precedent, such as Sullivan, as well as cases from other circuits that 
allowed for a more flexible view of injury in fact and direct harm.127  Instead, the court should 
have followed the reasoning laid out in the dissent, which noted that it is not difficult to 
characterize the educational harm alleged by the students as injury sufficient for standing.128   
 Standing doctrine should not be so narrow that plaintiffs affected by a blatant 
constitutional violation do not have standing to sue.  Because if they cannot sue, who can?  And 
if the answer is no one, the courts slam the door on students who wish to challenge their school 
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board.  That has grave consequences, because school boards know that they can continue funding 
non-public schools and religious institutions in an allegedly unconstitutional manner.  The 
Second Circuit effectively insulated the East Ramapo School Board from student lawsuits, and 
the school board therefore has absolutely no incentive to take care of its public schools.   
 There is an especially strong need for standing doctrine to be broader in the 
Establishment Clause context, because of the possibility that Establishment Clause cases often 
deal with allegations having to do with non-concrete injury, such as psychological injury, or a 
case like Montesa, where the students were not actually exposed to religion in the classroom.129  
Yet, while some circuits have affirmed standing in some of the psychological harm cases, public 
school students were denied standing in a case that alleged harm more concrete than 
psychological injury.  Those rulings are only some example of the wild inconsistencies inherent 
in modern standing jurisprudence, and a result of standing often being used by judges to deny 
controversial cases that they do not want to decide on the merit.130 
 But deciding cases, no matter how controversial, is the job of the judiciary.  And when 
the judiciary uses standing doctrine to dismiss controversial cases with merit brought by 
plaintiffs alleging injury, the judiciary does not do its job.  This problem is especially apparent 
when the plaintiffs represent politically disadvantaged groups or groups with unpopular 
positions.  And in Montesa, the student-plaintiffs cannot even remedy their situation at the next 
school board elections, because, as children, they cannot vote.  And the rights of children should 
not be subject to counting on their parents to vote. 
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 On the question of who can sue the school board in Montesa, the Second Circuit 
answered: No one.  But I am not satisfied with that answer, and neither should the courts.  
Rather, the circuit courts should follow the broader, more forgiving view of standing doctrine 
outlined in the Montesa dissent.  The standing requirements are a relatively modern invention by 
the courts, so it would not be particularly shocking to relax the standards to allow people who 
have been injured to seek redress. 
It is highly unlikely that the current conservative Supreme Court majority would overturn 
Montesa, but that does not put the issue of Establishment Clause standing to rest.  It is possible 
that as more scholars advocate for a broader view of standing, especially in the Establishment 
Clause context, more cases will be heard by the Circuit Courts.  Those cases may force the 
Supreme Court to address this issue at some point in the future, and one can only speculate as to 
the makeup of the court when that time comes, and how it would rule.  But if the Supreme Court 
does reconsider Establishment Clause standing, it should allow for a looser application then the 
Second Circuit used in Montesa, because when we ask who can sue the school board, the answer 
must be the students. 
 
  
